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CONSTRUCTING A NEW LIBERAL CAPITALISM:
CZECHOSLOVAKIAN LABOR LAW IN TRANSITION
Mark McLaughlin Hager*
INTRODUCTION
In late 1990 and early 1991 the National Assembly of the Czech and
Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR) enacted several pieces of new legislation to govern employment relations. The Collective Bargaining Act of
2
19901 (the Act) and the revision of the comprehensive Labor Code
(the Code) are two fundamental items of the new legislation. The Act
institutes rules for relationships between trade unions and employers
and the revision of the Code governs a wide range of employment topics. This Article addresses both of these key pieces of legislation.
The new Code, which took effect on February 1, amends the previous
Code3 dating from the period of Communist Party rule. The new Labor
Code' contains provisions pertinent to a wide range of topics, including
but not limited to trade unions, individual and collective employment
contracts, conditions for discharge, handicapped, female and young
workers, overtime, vacations, work stoppages, parental leave and child
care, safety, and disability compensation.'
The amended Code is worthy of close analysis for two reasons. First,
pursuant to section 6, the Code will govern labor relations for foreign
firms engaged in production within the CSFR.6 Accordingly, it is essential for foreign investors to familiarize themselves with the Code. Second, the Code represents a significant early effort to construct a liberal
* Associate Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, The American University. B.A. 1977, Amherst College; M.A. 1982, Harvard University; J.D. 1983, Harvard
Law School; Ph.D. 1990, Harvard University.
1. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AcT, zdkon C.12/1990 Sb.
2. LABOR CODE, zikon vc.3/1991 Sb.
3. LABOR CODE, zdkon v.6/1965 Sb. No. 32, Text 65.
4. LABOR CODE, zAkon v.3/1991 Sb.
5. Id. §§ 18-20, 22 (addressing trade unions and collective agreements). See generally id. §§ 42-64 (discussing requirements regarding termination of employment); id.
§§ 149-156 (setting forth standards regarding the employment of women and, specifically, pregnant women); id. §§ 163-168 (creating restrictions with respect to working
conditions for adolescents); LABOR CODE, zdkon C.3/1991 Sb. §§ 96-110c (creating
standards for overtime, night work and vacations); LABOR CODE, zikon '.3/1991 Sb.
§§ 157-160 (addressing rules regarding maternity leave); LABOR CODE, zikon lc.3/
1991 Sb. §§ 132-138 (setting forth standards regarding occupational safety).
6. LABOR CODE, zfkon c.3/1991 Sb. § 6.
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labor law for post-communist social democracy. It is expected that like
much of Eastern Europe, the CSFR will move towards increasing private ownership of productive wealth. It is also anticipated that it will
increasingly use market mechanisms to determine work relations and
income levels. These emerging aspects of capitalism are coupled with
widespread notions that successful economic transformation requires
expansion of managerial authority to structure and control workforces.
It is assumed that this authority is needed, along with sharpened work
incentives, to promote efficient techniques and employment levels. At
the same time, the country's socialist legacy may make it unacceptable
to expose workers to the unbridled managerial tyranny frequently characteristic of western capitalism. Hence, the Code, as it presently
stands, embodies a new and different variant of liberal compromise between ownership-management authority on the one hand, and
workforce protection on the other.
The history of the Code is significant. Prior to its collapse, the old
communist government launched the Labor Code amendment process.
The initiative was carried over and was ratified by the new government.
The amendments are especially interesting in light of this mixed origin.
The vast bulk of the old communist Code is simply restated with very
little change. 7 Even significant changes can hardly be called revolutionary. Due to the law's origins in the bosom of communism, voices within
the new government has already challenged the legitimacy of the
amended Code. The government has already taken steps towards more
far-reaching revisions in keeping with the new political regime and with
the incipient economic order.8 It is uncertain as to when these modifications may reach fruition and what the nature and depth of the changes
might be.
Two deletions from the old Code signal a change in social ideology
within the new Code. In the old Code's chapter of Basic Principles, the
first principle specified the right of all citizens to a job.' The second
principle specified that the Czechoslovakian social system "precludes
the exploitation of man by man."' 0 The drafters of the amended Code
omitted these exhortational principles possibly because their inclusion
7. Cf.id.at arts. I-IX (establishing that eight articles of the ten articles in the old
code remained the same).
8. See Burback & Painter, Restoration in Czechoslovakia, 42 MONTHLY REv. 36,
43-47 (April 1991) (noting that the passage of the amended labor code combined with
a heavy focus on economic development has led the Czechoslovakian government to
pass legislation restricting labor union activities, and may lead the government to restrict the right to strike in the future).
9. LABOR CODE, zAkon v.6/1965 Sb. § I.
10. Id. § II.
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might prove symbolically embarrassing to the new order."' The concept
of a right to a job may, arguably, seem incompatible with the tolerance
and even encouragement of high unemployment levels in a transformed
economy. Similarly the preclusion of "exploitation of man by man"
may seem incompatible with the property and labor relationships foreseen for the new order.
This Article will examine several prominent features of the Code
along with the novel labor relations system and philosophy it seems to
construct. Though it is not feasible to comment on all of the Code's
specific provisions, this Article explores the provisions that are most
crucial to shaping enterprise power relations and worker welfare. Part I
examines the Code's provisions that regulate worker discharge. Part II
discusses an employee's liability for damages. Part III analyzes the
Code's ban on certain vocations for women. Health and safety monitoring issues are surveyed in Part IV. Part V analyzes collective bargaining laws. Finally, Part VI concludes that the new legislation has the
ability to significantly shape the CSFR's employment laws.
I.

DISCHARGE BY REGULATION

Among the Code's most significant provisions are those regulating
worker discharge. If these regulations are followed and enforced, they
will strongly shape both worker power in enterprises and worker quality
of life.
Unlike most of Europe, United States labor law still clings strongly
to the doctrine of "employment at will."' 2 Perhaps better labelled "discharge at will," the United States common law doctrine is not affected
by federal statutory enactments concerning employment law. Consequently, employers are enpowered to fire workers without notice at any
time for any reason, unless employment contracts stipulate prerequisite
conditions for discharge,"3 or workers are engaging in activities for
11. See generally LABOR CODE, zAkon b.3/1991 Sb. §§ 11-X (noting that the new
code has either repealed or significantly altered the former introductory sections from
the Basic Principles of the 1965 Labor Code).
12. See Feinman, The Development of the Emploment at Will Rule, 20 A?&,.J.
LEGAL HIST. 118, 118-19 (1976) (explaining that the United States originally adopted
English law, creating a presumption of long term hiring and reasonable notice of termination, but by the nineteenth century had adopted by the 'employment at will' doctrine
whereby an employer may discharge an employee without notice and without cause
unless otherwise specified or restricted by contract). One of the major reasons for the
development and adherence to the 'employment at will' doctrine in the United States is
that the doctrine embodies and supports the fundamental principles of a capitalist
economy. Id. at 132.
13. See Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 A?.i. J.
LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976)(exploring the history of the employment at will rule). See
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"mutual aid and protection." Concomitant with its effect of maximizing worker insecurity, the discharge at will doctrine constricts worker
power in enterprises by minimizing the capacity to challenge or resist

managerial authority. For example, American firms frequently use
their discharge power to rid themselves of union activity that might
help improve worker living standards and on-the-job power. 14 The
CSFR's new Code repudiates discharge at will in favor of regulating
the circumstances and procedures under which workers may be fired. 15
Unless a contract specifies a term of employment, worker discharges
must comply with detailed Code provisions.' While regulating conditions for legal discharge, the Code leaves workers completely free to

quit employment for any or no particular reason.' 7 Professor Richard
Epstein has defended the United States' discharge at will rule by contending that without it workers could not be free to quit at will.' 8 The
Czechoslovakian Code fortunately rejects Epstein's position, which
rests on a logical non sequitur.

Though the new Code limits the conditions under which employers
may discharge employees, it places only modest restrictions on a
worker's freedom to quit a job. The Code plainly provides that "[a]

worker may give notice to the organization on any ground or without
stating the grounds."'19 This freedom to quit approximates the law of
the United States and confers worker power not enjoyed under the pre-

amendment Code. Under the new Czechoslovakian Code, workers may
leave a job two months after filing notice with an employer.

0

Under

also Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom on Limiting the Abusive
Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1401 (1967)(attacking the employment at will rule); Forrer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 36 Wisc. 2d. 388, 153 N.W.2d 587
(1967)(following the employment at will rule).
14. See Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization
Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983) (noting that in 1983 the odds of a
union member being fired for exercising rights guaranteed by federal law was one in
twenty). Despite the fact that it is illegal to dismiss union employees for exercising
their protected rights, American employers continue to use their discharge power unlawfully. Id.
15. See LABOR CODE, zdkon c.3/1991 Sb. §§ 42-64 (presenting a variety of circumstances and procedures regarding the termination of employment, including agreements to terminate, notice, immediate termination, and termination during probation
period).
16. See id. § 43 (addressing the issue of termination pursuant to an agreement).
17. Id. § 51.
18. See Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. Cm. L. REV. 947
(1984) (maintaining that several factors, including a basic intrinsic fairness of the rule,
its effect upon utility or wealth support, and its distributional consequences, support the
continued utility of the at-will rule).
19. LABOR CODE, zAkon c.3/1991 Sb. § 51.
20. Id. § 45(1).
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the old code, workers could be held to jobs for six months after filing
notice, unless the job departure stemmed from one of five specified reasons: 1) taking another job as part of an official recruiting scheme; 2)
entering graduate education or posts filled through formal competition;
3) inability to perform a job or entitlement not to work because of
medical disability, old age, pregnancy, or child-rearing; 4) employers'
contractual or statutory breaches, or 5) relocation by women to live
with husbands or by youths to live with parents."
The provisions of the new Code provide for two main types of discharge: first, a predominant type that can be referred to as discharge
by notice; 2 and second, an exceptional type that can be referred to as
discharge by immediate termination.2" An employer may immediately
terminate employment only if workers committed serious crimes or
egregious breaches of work discipline. 4
A.

DISCHARGE BY NOTICE

The termination by notice provisions constitute the basic regime for
worker discharge under the Code. The provisions forbid discharge except under specified conditions. Even where specific conditions for discharge are met, if the employee can be placed in or retrained for an
alternative job within the firm, the employee may not be fired unless he
or she refuses such an alternative job.2 The specified circumstances for
allowable discharge are fivefold: 1) the enterprise or a department is
abolished or relocated; 26 2) the worker becomes unnecessary due to
technological or organizational changes or efficiency-seeking staff reductions;2 7 3) the worker's health interferes with job performance or is
endangered by the job;28 4) the worker's performance is substandard; 9
5) the worker has seriously breached work discipline "° or has been convicted of a serious crime.31
The Code's discharge by notice provisions undoubtedly confer broad
employer authority to fire workers. They nevertheless promise to con21.
22.

LABOR CODE,
LABOR CODE,

zdkon '.6/1965 Sb. § 51(l).
zkon c.3/199I Sb. § 44.

23. Id. § 53.
24. Id.
25. Id. § 46(2). This provision does not operate in the case of a breach of work
discipline or other satisfaction of the requirements for immediate termination. Id.
26. Id. §§ 46(1)(a)-(b).
27. Id. § 46(c).
28. Id. § 46(d).
29. Id. § 46(e).
30.
31.

Id. §§ 46(0, 53(I)(b).
Id. § 53(I)(a).
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strain some of the most abusive discharge practices available to United
States employers under the employment at will doctrine: discharges for
union activism or to deter unionism, 32 for "whistle-blowing" on dangerous or criminal practices,3 3 or for asserting eligibility for employer-provided benefits.3 The scope of actual protection against abusive discharge under the Code will turn on enforcement and interpretation, of
course. Union activism and whistle-blowing vigilance may be chilled,
for example, if employers can successfully characterize such activities
as breaches of work discipline. Moreover, the success of these activities
will be further eroded if employers are allowed to advance disingenuous
allegations of substandard performance. It would be naive to expect
such situations not to arise, especially if interpretation and enforcement
are lenient.
Under termination by notice, workers discharged for reasons of
health, substandard performance, or disciplinary breach may enjoy up
to three months of employment between notice and final termination
while those discharged for reasons of organizational change or abolition

enjoy only two months.3 5 The new Code's provisions for continued employment after employer notice differ from those found in the old Code.
Under the old Code, periods of continued post-notice employment were
gauged to the worker's age, rather than to the reasons for discharge as
under the new Code. Hence, under the old Code discharged workers

under thirty years old could work for one month after notice; those
thirty to forty years old could work for two months; while those over
32. See, e.g., Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co. v. Budd, 138 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1943)(stating that an employer can discharge an employee for good reason or for poor reason, as
long as the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act are not violated). See also
Mueller Brass Co. v. NLRB, 544 F.2d 815, 819 (5th Cir. 1977) (stating that, absent a
showing of anti-union animus, an employer may discharge an at will employee for no
reason at all); see generally Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to
Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983) (arguing that
current United States labor laws do not prevent employers from using coercive or illegal acts to prevent unionization of employees).
33. See Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974)
(dismissing the allegation of a former salesman who stated he was discharged for notifying his superiors of the unsafe conditions of some steel products being sold, where the
complaint itself disclosed a legitimate reason for the discharge). But see Sheets v.
Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980) (holding that an
employer is liable in damages to a former at will employee if the employee was terminated for failure to comply with the firm's illegal practices).
34. See Price v. Carmack Datsun, Inc., 109 Ill. 2d 65, 485 N.E.2d 359 (1985)
(concluding that firing an employee for filing a health insurance claim could not be
considered an illegal retaliatory discharge since it did not violate a clearly mandated
public policy).
35. LABOR CODE, zikon c.3/1991 Sb. § 45(l).
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forty could work for three months.3 6 Under both the old and new
Codes, such privileges do not apply to workers subject to immediate
termination upon conviction for a serious crime or commission of a
grave disciplinary breach.3
B.

IMMEDIATE DISCHARGE AND SPECIAL PROTECTIONS AGAINST
DISCHARGE

Under the new Code, workers convicted of serious crimes or implicated in gross breaches of work discipline may be subject to immediate
discharge without notice. 8 Workers in certain circumstances, however,
are given special protections against discharge. These special protections are somewhat complex. Women on maternity leave may not be
terminated at all during the leave term, even if convicted of a serious
crime or guilty of a grave disciplinary breach.39 The old Code contained no such absolute protection against discharge.40
Furthermore, the new Code states that immediate termination may
not normally be applied against pregnant women or against a self-supporting male or female employee who lives alone and permanently attends to a child younger than three years.4 1 Termination by notice is
available against an employee in these circumstances only if he or she
has been convicted of a serious crime or else implicated in a grave disciplinary breach. 4 2 The old code contained a comparable prohibition on
immediate discharge that was coupled with a provision for discharge by
notice for women implicated in serious crimes or grave disciplinary
breaches.4 3 In the old code, however, this limited anti-discharge protection for serious bad actors was somewhat broader because it protected
a broader class of women. The old code protected all women permanently attending a child less than one year old.4 It bears emphasizing,
however, that the old code mentions and protects only women as primary child care providers, while the new Code offers protection to men
as well.
36. LABOR
37.

CODE,

zdkon v.6/1965 Sb. at § 45(2)(a)-(c).
§ 53(1); LABOR CODE, zkon C.6/1965 Sb.

LABOR CODE, zikon v.3/1991 Sb.

§ 53(1).
38. LABOR CODE, zikon b.3/1991 Sb. § 53(1).
39. Id. §§ 49(b), 53(1), (3).
40. See LABOR CODE, zAkon v.6/1965 Sb. § 53 (noting that the prior labor law

contained no provisions which considered women seperately).
41. LABOR CODE, zikon v.3/1991 Sb. § 53(3).
42. Id. §§ 53(1), (3).
43. Id. § 53(3).

44. Id.
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The evident purpose of such provisions is to foster the well-being of
small children, by protecting caretakers against sudden unemployment.
The provisions are peculiar in that they saddle enterprises with part of
the social burden of protecting small children from the consequences of
unemployment. The provisions do this by forcing firms to retain for
short periods of time what many would view as highly undesirable
workers. The burden is brief because the maternity leaves and continued employment periods are no longer than a few months. It is not
readily apparent, however, why private firms should shoulder society's
child care responsibility.
It is difficult to discern whether the CSFR, in its transitional state at
the moment, has adequate general protections for care of children
whose parents or primary caretakers fall short in resources. A discharged worker could suffer a sudden and drastic drop in income, depending on whether basic provisions governing unemployment subsistence allowances and pensions apply. 5 If society has an adequate
general mechanism for protecting small children against the effects of
primary caretaker unemployment, burdening firms with such responsibility seems redundant. Firms might be required to shoulder more of
this responsibility, however, if there is some bureaucratic reason why
society's general protection mechanisms cannot be activated promptly
after an immediate discharge. On the other hand, the anti-discharge
provisions may reflect concern that society's general protection mechanisms for small children are inadequate, so that a burden must be
thrown upon the discharging firm. If so, the protection offered by continued employment seems too brief. A few months of protection does
not seem to foreclose serious possible harms to dependent small children. In this light, the anti-discharge protections seem pointless unless
their purpose is simply to bridge an expected time lag between discharge and the onset of adequate social assistance measures.
Depending on the contours of social child care assistance, the antidischarge provisions may or may not make sense as a child protection
device. There may, however, be a different or additional purpose to the
anti-discharge provisions, beyond concern for child well-being. The
anti-discharge provisions may be designed to protect current or expectant child caretakers from the additional psychic stress of sudden job
loss, even if that caretaker is highly unsatisfactory as a worker. If this
is indeed the purpose of the special anti-discharge provisions, they
45. EMPLOYMENT LAW, zdkon v.12/1990 Sb. art. 17 (establishing the mechanism
for computing subsistence allowances).
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would represent a uniquely humane manifestation of sentimentality toward primary child caretakers.
In addition to the child care restrictions on immediate discharge, the
Code provides protections against routine discharge by notice. Although these protections do not apply for discharges due to enterprise
or departmental abolition or relocation, they offer substantial freedom
from insecurity over discharge due to a host of other reasons including:
technological or organizational charges, efficiency-seeking down-staffing, health considerations, substandard performance, and disciplinary
breaches. Workers in these categories of discharge may not be given
notice: when incapacitated for illness or accident (unless the incapacity
stems from the worker's drunkenness or his own willful act); when serving in the military or in the civil service; when given leave to serve in
public office; or when pregnant or serving as a self-supporting primary
caretaker for a child under three years of age.4
Special protections for workers in these categories are difficult to implement in situations where the employing entity has become extinct.
Hence, the Code confers no protection against routine dismissals in
those cases.," The new labor law also omits protection in the related
but distinct situation of relocation or organizational restructuring in the
employing entity. 48 In such situations it may be merely inconvenient to
confer ongoing employment on workers in protected categories. The
omission of such inconvenient protection may reflect a notion that economic progress depends crucially on freedom to enact enterprise reorganization, even if such freedom inflicts substantial hardship on discharged workers. This notion may also be behind the provision mentioned above which requires three months notice prior to discharges due
to health concerns, substandard performance, or disciplinary breach,
but requires only two months notice for discharges due to organizational change.' 9
The Code also saddles enterprises with responsibility for helping discharged workers secure alternative employment. The employer must, in
cooperation with state agencies responsible for employment, assist the
discharged worker in obtaining alternative appropriate employment.10
The employer's responsibility in this regard, however, does not apply to
discharges for substandard performance or disciplinary breaches.,"
LABOR CODE, zdkon C.3/1991 Sb. § 48.
47. Id. §§ 49(a), 46(I)(a).
46.
48.

Id. § 46(I)(b).

49. Id. §§ 45(1), 46(1)(a)-(c).

50. Id. § 47(1).
51.

Id. §§ 46(1)(a)-(d), 47(1).
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Moreover, the employer's assistance obligations are entirely unspecified. Depending on the eventual interpretation, this obligation may
amount to no more than referring discharged workers to state employment agencies.
For certain classes of workers, the employer's obligation to secure
alternate employment appears stronger. The stronger obligation applies
with respect to handicapped workers protected by pensions, to workers
discharged due to health risks, and to self-supporting workers with pri52
mary responsibility for care of children younger than fifteen years.
This regulation provides emphatically that the employer "shall secure"
appropriate alternative employment, with the assistance "if necessary"
from the employer's "superior organ."' 53 The language clearly suggests
that location of alternative employment is mandatory for the valid discharge of employees in the specially protected categories. This implication is strengthened by the additional provision that the discharge is not
final until the "aforesaid obligation" has been fulfilled. 54
It is difficult to predict whether these provisions will indeed be interpreted to mean that workers in the specified categories cannot be fired
unless alternative employment has actually been located. It may appear
excessively burdensome to saddle the discharging enterprises with an
absolute duty to locate alternative employment. Rather, the situation
may require shifting responsibility for such workers to state employment or social welfare agencies. A policy of ensured employment may
be wise, however, if such agencies appear inadequate to protect the designated workers against unemployment. There is one additional source
of puzzlement, which is why such protection should apply only to narrowly designated categories of workers and not to all workers who are
specially disadvantaged by job loss.
In view of the CSFR's current economic transition, any absolute
duty to locate alternative employment may have become obsolete. The
language of the provision contemplates that any employing entity that
discharges a worker may look to some "superior organ" to guarantee
alternative employment. 55 This assumption makes sense in a strongly
state-owned economy, like that of formerly communist CSFR: however,
the necessary mechanism for employment guarantees assumed by the
regulation may no longer exist. At least with respect to new or trans52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. § 47(2).
Id.
Id.
Id. See supra notes 35-38 (discussing termination provisions).
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formed private enterprises, it may appear extravagant to impose an absolute requirement of locating alternative employment.
II.

WORKER LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE

One use of the discharge at will rule in American law is to discipline
workers for substandard or negligent job performance. Workers know
that performance lapses may meet with a draconian sanction. The
Czechoslovakian Code places limits on discharge as a disciplinary device. At the same time, however, the Code establishes severe financial
penalties for substandard or negligent work. These penalties constitute
a disciplinary regime comparable in harshness to the discharge at will
scheme.
First, under a new provision not found in the old Code, workers who
perform deficiently may be stripped of their wages for the deficient
work at least in cases where the substandard work yields a "defective
product." 56 Though this loss of wage applies explicitly only where the
worker is "at fault", this limitation might often provide workers little
protection against having the costs of substandard production shifted
onto their backs. Moreover, in addition to wage loss, workers may face
additional severe financial sanctions.
The basic penalty for substandard or negligent work performance is
that the worker must reimburse the employer for the actual damage
caused. 57 These penalty provisions are carried over unaltered in basic
substance from the old code.58 The reimbursement penalty applies
against workers "for any damage they have caused to their organization by culpable breach of their duties in the performance of their work
or in direct connection therewith."5 The reimbursement provisions
pose a deep threat to workers because there are numerous circumstances which might be treated as culpable breaches in work performance. At one end of the spectrum, we might imagine a drunken worker
who destroys a tool or a product part through inept handling. At the
other end, imagine a novice worker lost in a momentary daydream who
calibrates a measuring instrument wrongly for a day's work. The miscalibration is not discovered until close of business, meaning that a
day's worth of production and potential profit is lost. Imagine further
that this lapse leads to a late delivery to customers, triggering contrac56. LABOR CODE, zikon v.3/1991 Sb. § 118.
57. Id. §§ 172, 179.
58. See LABOR CODE, zdkon vc.6/1965 Sb. §§ 172, 179 (outlining compensation
liabilities for damages caused by substandard work).
59. LABOR CODE, zAkon vc.3/1991 Sb. § 172.
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tual penalties and loss of future business promised by customers. For
how much of this damage to the organization should the careless
worker be held liable? Nothing in the language of the penalty provision
prevents workers from incurring enormous penalties for relatively minor lapses. Moreover, the Code offers no hint that workers may avoid
draconian penalties by simply quitting. Quitting workers would apparently carry their fines with them out the door.
The American tort system theoretically allows firms to sue workers
for on-the-job negligence. It is rare, however, that such suits are
brought or carried to success, except in cases of flagrant worker carelessness. The Czechoslovakian Code seems to authorize compulsory reimbursement for far less egregious forms of work deficiency, up to and
including simple poor performance. American firms rarely try to measure and seek reimbursement for the damage attributable to poor employee performance. There is an interest in ignoring petty incidents of
poor performance because reimbursement efforts entail costs. American
workers who stand out as serious problems may come under a variety
of disciplinary sanctions, including fines, legitimated within the regime
of an employment contract. The worker who views such penalties as
excessively onerous may escape by quitting the job. If that happens, a
firm that is insistent on reimbursement must seek it in the cumbrous
and perhaps unsympathetic forum of a court.
The Czechoslovakian Code may induce employers to seek a higher
level of reimbursement than is common in the United States. Rather
than treating mere poor performance as a routine cost, rational employers may treat it as a compensable harm. Employers might feel a
strong incentive to monitor and seek recompense for substandard work,
if a high proportion of such cases yielded actual reimbursement. This
could occur if factfinders determining whether reimbursement should
be paid are employer-sympathetic enough to impose broad recompense
standards upon workers. The broad language of the reimbursement
statute, in conjunction perhaps with an oversimplified ideology of seeking "efficiency" through stringent worker discipline, could produce such
outcomes. An employer's prospects of securing actual reimbursement
could be strengthened if penalties are imposed even after a worker
quits. This would further enhance employer incentives to shift the costs
of poor work onto the backs of individual workers.
Equally troubling are possible implications that the reimbursement
provisions may carry for general workplace discipline. Workers may
come to live in fear of penalties imposed for real or alleged work insufficiencies, especially if such penalties cannot be escaped even through
the drastic step of quitting. Such fear could drive workers toward inor-
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dinate subservience, passivity, and deference, to avoid the possible consequences of being seen as trouble-makers. Work performance penalties
could provide employers with a powerful weapon against unionism and
other forms of resistance against employer autocracy.
Several Code provisions deal in detail with work performance penalties. A general limit on worker liability is fixed at triple the monthly
wage of the penalized worker. This limit, however, does not apply if the
damage occurs under the influence of alcohol or drugs.6 0 Workers
under the maximum penalty are likely to experience severe hardship,
although the three-month-wage ceiling may be better for workers than
no ceiling at all.
A section on defective products provides that workers who through
neglect cause a defect may lose up to a half-month's wage as penalty.
The worker's penalty may include the costs of wasted materials, repair
of the damaged product and any damaged machinery, and even the
cost of wages paid by the employer in producing the defective product.6 l Though the provision may not compel draconian penalties for minor lapses, it certainly seems to encourage them.
An alarming feature of the work performance penalties is that their
imposition and severity is left primarily in the hands of the employer,
rather than with a neutral tribunal.62 This arrangement maximizes the
disturbing incentives and disciplinary implications discussed above. The
Code hints vaguely that judicial review of employer-imposed penalties
may be possible, 3 but the procedures and standards for such review are
nowhere specified. In a gesture of leniency, the Code also provides for
possible relaxation of the defective product penalty in situations where
the defect stemmed from "excusable mistake" by an "otherwise conscientious worker." Leniency is constrained, however, by the specification of minimum penalties: one third of actual damage.6"
60. Id.§ 179.
61. Id. § 184(1).
62. See id. § 185(2) (stating that the amount of compensation is determined by the
employer). But see id. at § 172(3) (requiring the employer to "prove the worker's
culpability").
63. LABOR CODE, zdkon c.3/1991 Sb. § 183(l) (allowing the amount of compensation to be reduced by the employer "or a court" to a level lower than that specified in
the Code).

64. Id. § 184(3).
65. Id. The minimum penalty subsection also provides that a minimum penalty of
one-sixth of the worker's monthly wages is to apply if actual damage exceeds a halfmonth's salary. Id. This additional portion is superfluous, because if the actual damage
exceeds a half-month's salary, the basic penalty of one third the actual damage could
not be less than one-sixth of a month's wages.
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In some ways the most disquieting aspect of the work performance
penalties lies in the general orientation and not in their specific provisions. Through these statutory provisions, the state enters a partnership
with employers in the enforcement of work discipline. Such an orientation was alarming enough in a system of state socialist enterprise.
There, it signalled an authoritarian and punitive focus on individual
worker deficiencies as an approach to work discipline. The Code
originated as a communist-regime legal initiative."6 As such it highlights the disturbing failure of that regime to emphasize worker-controlled mechanisms of discipline and performance regulation. The
Code's authoritarian and punitive stance retains its deeply alarming
cast, however, when we imagine its application in a regime of private
enterprise. There, the Code's orientation would function not in defense
of public property in which workers themselves hold a stake, but in
defense of the private property of enterprise owners, who might feel
strong economic incentives to enforce punitive sanctions stringently.
Concern over a system which pits workers against the power of private
capital can only be deepened when we contemplate the heavy hand of
the state so clearly poised to augment capital's power.
III. JOBS BARRED TO WOMEN
The new Code carries forward without significant modification the
old Code's anachronistic and overbroad restrictions on performance of
certain jobs by women. In the Fundamental Principles to the new
Code, article VII articulates a complex but admirable vision of workplace equality for women:
Women are entitled to the same status at work as men. Women must be guaranteed working conditions enabling them to participate in work not only with
regard to their physiology but in particular with regard to their role in society as
mothers and in raising and attending to children. 7

The Code reneges woefully on this commitment in a section headed
"Prohibition on Certain Kinds of Work" in a division entitled "Working Conditions of Women." 8 Paragraph one of the prohibition section
bans women from all underground manual work involved in mining and
66. See Czechoslovakia Announces Wide Legal Changes on Reform, Reuters (July
6, 1987, A.M. Cycle), available in LEXIS, NEXIS library, REUTER file (reporting
Communist Party Central Committee Secretary Miles Jakes' announcement that several laws including the labor code would be amended, issued, or abrogated in the wake
of reforms in the Soviet Union).
67. LABOR CODE, zikon c.3/1991 Sb. art. VII.
68. LABOR CODE, zdkon c.3/1991 Sb. § 150.
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tunnelling.69 Though one can only speculate as to the original rationale
behind such a ban, one suspects that it stems from exaggerated perceptions of female incapacity to perform the hard labor involved and from
sexist assumptions about the unsuitability for women of the dirty, dangerous, and unpleasant aspects of underground labor. Undeniably,
there may be some forms of hard labor where women, on the average,
are unable to perform as effectively as men. This should not be confused, however, with the notion that there are no women strong enough
to perform as well as many or most men doing such work. The ban
imposed by the Code makes precisely this assumption.
It is noteworthy that the provision bans women not from a broad
spectrum of hard manual labor tasks, but only from those related to
mining and tunnelling.7 0 This reinforces a suspicion that the ban reflects not only concern about hard manual labor, but also the concern
about the unsuitability of women to work in underground labor environments. If so, the provision is the more objectionable for its constricting sentimentalism as to qualities of the feminine.
Paragraph two of the prohibition reflects even more alarmingly such
sentimentalism, which may severely limit opportunities for women in
the workplace. This paragraph bars women from all work that may be
deemed "physically inappropriate or harmful to their organism." 7 1 The
sexist assumptions and potential of such a prohibition emerge as soon
as one wonders whether there are many jobs that would be specifically
harmful to the female organism, but not to the male. If one posits a
narrow purpose of protecting female reproductive capacities, one may
prevent the broadest and most female-restrictive interpretations of such
a prohibition. The paragraph highlights such a purpose with its particular prohibition on work which might endanger woman in "their role as
mothers. '7 1 Even applying this narrow interpretation, however, the prohibition could drastically curtail work opportunities for women.
The controversy surrounding the United States Supreme Court's decision in International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc. 3 best presents
the issue. The Court ruled that it is illegal for employers to ban all
women of childbearing age from jobs that exposed them to toxics po69.

Id. § 150(l).

70. Id.

71. LABOR CODE, zdkon 'C.3/1991 Sb. § 150(2).
72. Id. The section also provides that central authorities shall issue lists or jobs and
workplaces inappropriate for women who are pregnant or mothers to work. Id. The
provision further requires that the lists be continuously supplemented and amended as
science and technology advance. Id.
73. International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., U.S. 111 S.Ct. 1196

(1991).
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tentially harmful to reproductive organs and fetuses. 4 The Supreme
Court found such bans to constitute sex discrimination, insofar as they
apply to women with no intention of getting pregnant and even to
women with fixed and stated intentions not to become pregnant. 7 The
vice of employment prohibitions aimed to protect reproductive capacities is that such bans may treat a woman's capacity for reproduction
and/or the hypothetical but as yet non-existent fetuses as more important than the actual and current human experience, ambition, and life
plans of the woman herself. That is, such bans treat a woman's reproductive capacity entirely as a conservable public resource, ignoring her
own intimate relationship with that "resource" and her personal interest in exercising control over it. It also slights all wider interests she
may have as a worker with her own ambitions and economic needs.
Hopefully, such prohibitions in the Code will retain only a narrow application and future amendments will significantly revise them.
IV.

HEALTH AND SAFETY MONITORING

The old Code contained significant provisions as to responsibilities
for monitoring and ensuring workplace health and safety.76 The new
Code amendments heavily revised this area. Strikingly enough, the new
Code expands considerably on the old Code by detailing and specifying
roles and responsibilities. 7 Hopefully, this expansion and specificity
represents and reinforces a redoubled commitment to workplace health
and safety.
The new Code specifies several types of enterprise responsibilities for
work safety, among them: to make technical and organizational
changes in response to both health and safety regulations and new technology capable of augmenting workplace health and safety; 78 to inform
managers and work forces of health and safety regulations, to test such
knowledge periodically, and to monitor compliance with the regulations;7 1 to ensure protection for individual workers against health risks
specific to them;80 to record occupational dangers and harmful incidents, to report them to appropriate authorities, and to ameliorate their
74.

75.
76.
77.

zdkon
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 1207.

Id. at 1203-04.
LABOR CODE, zdkon v:.6/1965 Sb. §§ 132-138.
Compare LABOR CODE, zAkon v:.6/1965 Sb. §§ 132-138, with LABOR CODE,
c.3/1991 Sb. §§ 132-138.
LABOR CODE, zkon v:.3/1991 Sb. § 133(1)(a).
Id. § 133(1)(b).
Id. § 133(1)(c). The section also applies to overtime and night work. Id.
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causes;"' and to respect workers in their right to refuse work performance posing direct and serious dangers.82 The new Code also requires
employers to supply safety equipment and anti-hazard wash-up aids
and facilities,83 and to ban smoking in the workplace. 8' If enforceable
and enforced, these enterprise responsibilities will significantly improve
workplace health and safety. Enforcement, of course, is the paramount
question mark.
The Code provisions for worker and trade union participation in
health and safety monitoring enchance the possibilities for enforcement. Here too, the new Code specifically and expansively details roles
and responsibilities. Workers must report health and safety hazards to
superiors within the enterprise and to regulatory officials.8 Even more
significant, trade unions receive statutory authority to supervise enterprise compliance with health and safety rules;86 to inspect workplaces
for hazards; 7 to inspect workplace accident investigations and to perform such investigations themselves; 8 to order enterprises to ameliorate
unsafe conditions;89 and to consult, where relevant, on hazard issues."0
Alongside these provisions for worker and union participation in ensuring health and safety compliance, the Code lists worker duties that include compliance with all anti-hazard rules and guidelines;" participation in anti-hazard instructional courses;92 abstinence from drugs,
alcohol, and smoking; 3 cooperation with medical testing procedures;'
and use of protective aids and facilities. 5 It is controversial that workers are required to submit to workplace alcohol and drug testing, ad81. Id. § 133(l)(e). The code requires that such elimination occur "without delay."
id.
82. LABOR CODE, zdkon 'C.3/1991 Sb. § 133(l)(O. Such a right arises anytime a
worker possesses a "justifiable suspicion." Id.
83. Id. § 133(2). This includes "free personal protective aids," cleaning supplies
and disinfectants, protective beverages, food supplements, clothing and footwear. Id.
84. Id. § 133(3).
85. Id. § 133(2)(f).
86. LABOR CODE, zdkon C.3/1991 Sb. § 136(l)(a-c).
87. Id. § 136(1)(a).
88. Id. § 136(l)(b).

§ 136(1)(c).

89.

Id.

90.
91.

Id. § 132(1)(a-e).
Id. § 135(2)(a).

LABOR CODE, zdkon '.3/1991 Sb. § 135(2)(d).
93. Id. § 135(2)(b). This section also requires workers to submit to testing to detect
if under the influence. Id.
94. Id. § 135(2)(f). The provision mandates that workers also participate to the
best of their ability in eliminating such defects. Id.
95. Id. § 135(2)(c). The Code also requires that workers care and maintain equipment in proper manners. Id.

92.
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ministered by enterprises or state agencies.96 One is led to wonder
whether this requirement to comply with testing has been adequately
studied from the standpoints of privacy and civil liberty.
V.

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

In addition to amending the Labor Code, the Czechoslovakian legislature recently passed a collective bargaining law. 7 This new law is
part of an envisioned transition in which labor relations will be freed of
state administrative control, so that income distribution and employment relations may be governed by market forces and channelled
through collective bargaining wherever unions are present. It is not
clear how thoroughgoing the transition to a free market economy may
be or should be. Until this is clear, the nature of Czechoslovakian employment relations will be difficult to analyze. The economy currently
hovers in a no-man's land where there is neither a plan nor a market
and where relations are determined through a murky mix of administrative command, custom, collective bargaining and individual contracting with enterprises. Unpredictable developments, both domestic
and international, will decisively shape the nature of emerging economic power structures. In such a fluid context, it is disingenuously
academic to discuss terms of the Collective Bargaining Act with a focus on how they will affect economic power. On the current Czechoslovakian scene, it is likely that envisioned power relations deliberately
designed by law will be swamped and overwhelmed by the clash of interests and ideologies outside the legal world. With all these cautions
firmly in mind, it is nevertheless thought-provoking to analyze the law
in an effort to discern what power configurations it may tend to
encourage.
The initial portions of the Act specify that collective bargaining
agreements may be struck between unions or union federations and enterprise or enterprise federations. 8 The Act then specifies procedures
for bargaining and filing agreements and for mediating and arbitrating
disputes under such agreements.99 The Act then proceeds to its most
crucial power-allocative provisions: those governing strikes. 100 The
power-allocative dimensions of these provisions may be highlighted by
comparison with United States law.
96.

Id. § 135(2)(g).

97.

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACT,

98.

LABOR CODE,

99.

Id. §§ 10-15.

100.

Id. §§ 16-26.

zdkon vc.1/1990 Sb.

zdkon vc.3/1991 Sb. §§ 2-4.
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The availability and strength of the strike weapon is critical in determining work force bargaining power against enterprises. Strikes or
threats thereof compel employers to grant satisfactory wages and conditions for their workers. In several respects the Czechoslovakian Act
seems to confer strong strike power on work forces. Upon close inspection, however, that power may be less than at first it appears. Most
importantly, the Act protects workers from losing their jobs if they
strike. This protection frees workers from a critical fear that may inhibit willingness to strike and thereby sap work force bargaining power.
Though United States law purports by statute to bless striking workers with protections against job loss,101 the Supreme Court's notorious
Mackay Radio10 2 decision grants enterprises the right to hire permanent replacements for workers striking over economic issues. This
means that striking workers lose their jobs unless an employer has job
openings, in the aftermath of a strike that are not occupied by replacements. In the past two decades United States employers have grown
increasingly aggressive and sophisticated in deploying permanent
replacements as an anti-strike weapon. As a consequence, workers are
deterred from striking and if there is a strike, enterprises often successfully maintain pre-strike production levels. Hence, strikes have grown
vanishingly rare in the United States. This has provoked severe deterioration in work force bargaining power and a weakening of workers'
living standards. Initiatives in the United States Congress have recently
10 3
been aimed at banning the hiring of permanent striker replacements.
The Czechoslovakian Act seems to thwart the spectre of job loss with
a provision prohibiting enterprises from recruiting "other citizens to replace participants in the strike at the worksite." 1 ° This provision seems
to embody a blanket ban on the U.S. style of permanent replacements.
At least three major ambiguities with crucial importance for power
configurations lay beyond this surface meaning, however.
First, the provision's ban is so blunt and emphatic as to suggest that
it prohibits hiring not only permanent but temporary striker replacements as well. If so, this is good news for work forces because it means
that strikes may not only proceed without provoking job loss, but may
inflict meaningful damage on struck enterprises which cannot maintain
normal production because they can hire no replacements. This strike
veto power over production may greatly enhance work force bargaining
101.
102.
103.
1991).
104.

29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 163 (1982).
NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
H.R. 5, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG REC. H5565-66 (daily ed., July 17,
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AcT,

zdkon C.1/1990 Sb. § 25.
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strength. If the Act indeed forbids even temporary replacements, it
which prohibit
goes beyond current United States congressional bills,
10 5
use of permanent but not temporary replacements.
There is, however, a significant pro-employer ambiguity in the language of the provision, in the language that replacements are banned at
the "worksite."'' 0 This could be interpreted as limiting language, allowing employers to hire even permanent replacements so long as the
work is removed to another site. If this is indeed allowed, firms would
retain considerable strike-breaking power. This would be especially true
for firms with more than one production site in existence at the onset of
the strike, allowing work to be transferred easily.
Another interpretation of the provision would limit job protection for
strikers even more severely. The provision could be read to ban not the
employment of striker replacements but merely their recruitment "at
the worksite." Though possible, this interpretation seems implausibly
narrow and could make sense only as a rather peculiar means of forestalling job site violence between strikers and potential replacements.
A second critical pro-employer ambiguity exists within this provision.
The prohibition on replacements might seem to include within it a prohibition on the more drastic employer step of discharging strikers outright. Under United States law, replaced workers retain at least a potential right of reinstatement if job openings exist despite the hiring of
replacements. °7 Thus, being replaced is potentially better than outright
discharge. A provision to protect striker jobs would be of limited use if
it protected workers only against replacement, but not against a more
severe sanction of outright discharge. Therefore, it is noteworthy that
the Czechoslovakian Act is drafted such that replacement hiring is forbidden during "the course of a strike."' 1 8 If "course of a strike" is read
as limiting language in the prohibition, enterprises might be deemed
entirely free to make outright discharges of ex-strikers after the strike
ends.
This would of course exert a major chilling effect on workers contemplating a strike. Workers who knew they could be discharged might
risk a strike only if confident that the action would be powerful enough
to coerce the struck enterprise into a contractual agreement not to dis105. See H.R. 5, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG REc. H5565-66 (daily ed., July
17, 1991) (amending the National Labor Relations Act to prevent discrimination based
on participation in labor disputes).

106.

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACT,

zdkon '.1/1990 Sb. § 25.

107. See Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366 (1968)(holding that this right to reinstatement continues to exist as long as the strikers have not found other employment).
108. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACT, zfkon v.1/1990 Sb. § 25.
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charge ex-strikers. By the same token strikers would be reluctant to
end work stoppages without first securing such contractual protection.
This would have a tendency to make strikes longer than they would be
if strikers knew their jobs would be secure as a matter of law at the
close of a strike.
It is conceivable that employer power to discharge ex-strikers might
be conferred in a misguided effort to restrain worker exercise of bargaining power through strikes. If so, the Act would augment worker
power on the one hand, by protecting strikers against job loss and perhaps by allowing workers to force drastic curtailments in production.
On the other hand, the Act would constrain worker power by signaling
workers not to wield such power lightly or in vain, in situations where
they lack power to enforce post-strike job retention through contract.
There is reason to conclude that the "course of the strike" language
cannot be construed as limiting language in the prohibition. First, there
is the sheer anomaly of protecting workers from discharge during a
strike, only to leave them vulnerable once the strike is over. Second, the
conditions for allowable discharge in the Labor Code discussed above
do not include worker strike participation.109 The most straightforward
way to read the Code is that it prohibits discharge of strikers. Although
it contains no specific prohibitions, perhaps under the rubric of disciplinary breach, the provisions could be read to allow discharge of strikers.
If the Code indeed does not allow striker discharge, the "course of the
strike" language in the Act's anti-replacement provision becomes superfluous. On the other hand, if the "course of the strike" language
limits the Act's ban on replacements, the Act greatly modifies proper
interpretation of the Code.
Workers sometimes have an interest in frustrating normal production
while remaining on the job, rather than going out on strike, due to the
hardships of wage loss imposed by strikes. Law in the United States
offers no solace to workers who wish to frustrate production while
avoiding the hardships of a strike. Under United States law, workers
who engage in slowdowns or other partial work stoppages may be discharged." 0 Here again, the new Czechoslovakian Act may confer a
109. See supra notes 26-43 and accompanying text (discussing grounds for termi-

nation with notice and for immediate discharge).
110. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960) (holding
that since partial or intermittant strikes are illegal, the National Labor Relations Act
allows an employer to properly discharge workers engaging in such activities). See also
NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F.2d 486, 497 (8th Cir. 1946) (stating that

the employee's refusal to obey reasonable instructions of the employer, given while employment continued and the employee was not on strike, was proper grounds for dis-
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higher degree of worker power. The Act defines "strike" as including
partial as well as complete work stoppages. 11 ' Any legal protections enjoyed by full strikers thereby apply equally to on-the-job or partial
strikers.
If such legal protections are indeed as strong as some interpretations
of the Act would make them, the Act confers upon workers very significant power to frustrate production while at least partially protecting
income. The Act specifies that strikers are entitled to no wages during
a strike; this provision presumably applies to on the job or partial strikers as well as full strikers. In this light it might seem self-defeating to
engage in a partial strike, which would frustrate production less completely than a full strike, with the same loss of wages. On the other
hand, partial strikes, slowdowns and other on-the-job tactics to frustrate production can often be practiced in a fashion so as to conceal the
identities of participants, a possibility absent in a full strike. On-the-job
tactics therefore present at least the possibility that workers may frustrate production effectively with lower income losses than full strikes
would cost. Potential strikers may be more willing to run the risks of
discovery and wage loss under the Code than under United States law,
if they are protected at least against the risk of job loss.
In what first appears as a strong anti-worker provision, the Act empowers firms to lock out their work forces, under certain circumstances,
in order to exert economic pressure." 2 If the ban on replacement workers applies to lock-outs as well as strikes, this lock-out power may provide employers with little or no advantage in many cases, since the
locking-out employer would then suffer heavy production loss, due to
inability to hire replacement workers. Under the Code, workers may
even prefer lock-outs to strikes because they remain entitled to half
wages in case of lock-out."' Under United States law, employers may
utilize a lock-out to pressure workers free of wage-payment obligations,
and may perhaps maintain production through use of replacements.""
charge); Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333 (1950) (holding that a concerted plan to
effect a work slow down is not a "protected activity" under the NLRA).
111. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACT, zAkon c.1/1990 Sb. § 16(2).
112. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACT, zAkon c.1/1990 Sb. § 27(1).
113. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACT, zdkon c.1/1990 Sb. § 30.
114. Compare Loomis Courier Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 235 N.L.R.B. 534 (1978),
enforcement denied on other grounds, 595 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding a violation
of the NLRA in discharging employees and thereafter treating them as new hires) and
Oshkosh Ready-Mix Co., 179 N.L.R.B. 350 (1969), enfd sub. nom., Inland Trucking
Co. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 562 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971) (finding an
unfair labor practice in locking out employees and continuing to operate with substitutes after expiration of the collective bargaining agreement), with Inter Collegiate
Press, 199 N.L.R.B. 177 (1972), afd, 486 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 416
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Under both the Act and United States law, the employer's main advantage in holding lock-out power is the chance to choose the timing
for a confrontation, rather than letting the union choose. Choice of timing may be used strategically by a party to inflict maximum damage on
the adversary and minimum damage on itself, as when a union calls a
strike during a crucial rush order the employer is trying to fill. Aside
from timing, there is little in either United States law or under the
Czechoslovakian Act to induce employers to prefer a lock-out to a
strike. Under United States law, employers stand a good chance of
maintaining production throughout either lock-out or strike by means
of the power to hire replacements. Under the Act, employers stand an
equal chance of losing production under either lock-out or strike, if
replacements are banned for both. Under both the Code and United
States law, employers face certain disadvantages in choosing a lock-out
over strike. Under United States law, the disadvantage is that the employer who locks out may be permitted to hire only temporary replacements while the struck employer may surely hire permanent replacements.11" Hence, production may be easier to maintain in a strike than
in a lock-out because it is easier to hire replacements if they can be
promised security of job tenure. Under the Act, lock-out has the disadvantage of allowing non-working employees to draw half wages, thus
increasing their hold-out power. Hence under both sets of laws, lockouts carry disadvantages and employers will use them only when the
timing advantages outweigh those disadvantages. The significance of
lock-out power may be greater under United States law than under the
Act, however, because under United States law the employer may not
need not to sacrifice production in order to pressure workers with a
lock-out. On the other hand, even under the Act, where lockout presU.S. 938 (1974) (permitting an employer to hire workers when motivated only by legitimate and substantial business reasons and not by desire to discourage employees from
the exercise of their collective bargaining rights) and Ottawa Silica Co., 197 N.L.R.B.
449 (1972), aft'd, 482 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 916 (1974)
(condoning the hiring of replacement workers when expressly used only for the duration of the labor dispute and without the aim of discouraging union membership).
115. It is unclear whether employers engaged in lock-outs are permitted to hire
permanent replacements because United States courts have scarcely addressed this issue. One decision on the issue seemed to rule the use of permanent replacements legal.
Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. NLRB, 557 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied.
436 U.S. 956 (1978). The facts of the case were unusual, however, because they involved high levels of machinery damage and work interruption prior to the strike vote.
Id. at 1129-32. According to the decision, this justified the employer in treating the
situation as an unprotected in-plant strike, so that the employer was allowed to fire and
permanently replace the entire work force. Id. at 1133. A clear Board position hostile
to use of permanent replacements by employers who lock out may finally have been
established in Harter Equip., 293 N.L.R.B. 647 (1989).
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sure probably comes at the cost of lost production, there may be situations where employers will be anxious to use it and workers would be
better off if it were banned.
The Act's provisions on liability for damage may tend to discourage
strikes. Wisely, the Act protects strikers from liability for damages an
employer sustains due to work stoppage itself.' 16 More problematically,
however, the Act makes strikers liable for "any damage due to an event
occurring in the course of the strike." ' The scope of liability exposure
for strikers under this provision could be breathtakingly broad. A provision of this type would be less objectionable if each striker's liability
were confined to damage he or she caused during a strike. As drafted,
however, the provision potentially makes each striker liable for damage
caused by any striker. This would severely chill the propensity to strike,
holding it hostage to worker fears of undisciplined members in their
midst. Moreover, as drafted, the provision might apply liability to strikers even when no striker has directly caused damage. Suppose, for example, machinery maintenance has been neglected prior to a strike, but
is further neglected during a strike and the machinery then fails. Read
broadly, the liability provision could saddle all strikers with liability.
Strikers might appeal to the provision protecting against liability for
work stoppage damage, but that provision is drafted narrowly, offering
protection against liability only for damage caused "solely" by interruption of work.118 Depending on how broadly or narrowly the liability
and protection-against-liability provisions are read, workers could face
severe financial risks from striking. The problem might be remedied by
narrowing the liability provision, so that no striker would answer for
damage he did not cause directly.
CONCLUSION
It is far too soon to predict the overall significance of the recent labor
law legislation in the CSFR. Economic hard times, tension between the
Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, and the uncertain evolution
of legal institutions are just some of the factors that could momentously shape even the short-term future of employment relations in the
CSFR. This Article does not speculate on these factors, but has merely
explored interpretational issues posed by the enactments themselves,
highlighting ambiguities and possible implications.
116.

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACT,

117.
118.

Id. § 23(1).
Id. § 23(2).

zdkon v.1/1990 Sb. § 23(2).

1992]

CZECHOSLOVAKIAN LABOR LAW

The new Labor Code appears to offer workers greater protection
against job dismissal than "at will" workers in the United States typically enjoy. In several respects, the new Code offers greater protections
than did its predecessor, though in some respects the reverse is true and
in others the two Codes are essentially similar. The main form of job
security offered by the new Code is that, aside from exceptional circumstances involving criminal convictions or gross disciplinary breach,
workers may be fired for one of several legally-enumerated reasons and
with notice. The new Code also offers special, though perhaps poorlydesigned, anti-discharge safeguards for workers involved in primary
child care for small children. For additional worker protection, the new
Code imposes difficult-to-interpret duties on firms to secure alternative
employment for workers they discharge.
As a device to secure worker discipline and quality production, the
new Code authorizes strikingly broad and severe damage payments for
substandard work. These sanctions may unfairly penalize workers for
events over which they exercise little or no control, and may unduly
stifle work force activities designed to augment worker power against
employers.
Despite protestations of concern for female equality, the new Code
borrows, nearly unaltered, provisions from the old Code that ban
women from occupations deemed dangerous for them. These provisions
stem from outmoded and uncritical sentimentalism about the peculiar
nature of the female body and the activities dangerous or inappropriate
to it.
The new Code imposes substantially new responsibilities for monitoring and ensuring workplace health and safety, unmatched by both the
previous Code and by prevailing United States law. Specified responsibilities for enterprises may help ensure vigorous health and safety protection, depending on the level of enforcement. Equally promising is the
grant of worker and trade union authority to actively assist enforcement efforts through inspections, consultations, and orders requiring
enterprises to ameliorate unsafe conditions.
The new Collective Bargaining Act sets out provisions on bargaining
procedures and also the means for contract-enforcement and dispute
resolution. The Act also lays out crucial but deeply ambiguous provisions for regulating bargaining power between employers and their
work forces. Though such provisions seem stronger than comparable
United States law in fostering worker bargaining power, some interpretations of those provisions might actually grant workers very little protection. The most critical ambiguities in this area concern the degree to
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which the Act protects workers from the spectre of job loss if they
strike.

